What Do You Want Me to Do Again Africa

Introduction

In 1977, the Soviet Union'southward leadership was in a celebrating mood as Federal democratic republic of ethiopia had merely switched sides to the socialist campsite.ⁱ Past the time of this event, the Kremlin had been conducting a renewed offensive on the continent for several years, propping up socialist regimes and 'liberation movements' in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, Rhodesia (later Republic of zimbabwe) and South Africa. Nevertheless opposite to warnings that the Soviets might eventually 'eat' all of sub-Saharan Africa,² past 1990 the offensive had fizzled out: ideologically and financially broken, Moscow cut military assistance, suspended credit lines, wound downwardly diplomatic representations, airtight cultural centres and ultimately withdrew political back up. When rebel forces advanced towards Addis Ababa in 1991, Moscow stood idly by as the Derg government – its former poster child – disintegrated.

Over the course of the next two decades, mail-Soviet Russia showed little involvement in the sub-continent and but in the tardily 2010s did the Kremlin once over again display the appetite to play a greater geopolitical role: sub-Saharan Africa remerged in Russian political discourse and trade and diplomatic traffic picked up. Simultaneously, Moscow revived alumni associations of Africans who studied in the Soviet Union and launched initiatives to lure more students to Russia. The Wagner Group – a military enterprise connected to the Russian state – also expanded its radius of activity south of the Sahara.³

But what is driving Moscow's renewed activism? How different information technology is from its previous diplomatic thrusts? Tin can a coherent strategy be discerned behind this push? Finally, how is sub-Saharan Africa reacting to Russia'due south overtures and what does information technology mean for the European union?

Why: four reasons behind Russia's outreach to Africa

Several overlapping and mutually reinforcing factors can assist decipher Russia's motivations and objectives. First of all, the Soviet Union'south engagement in sub-Saharan Africa had left a bitter aftertaste in Moscow: the Soviets experienced ephemeral geopolitical gains, while fiscal costs kept escalating. Indeed, almost all that remained in the wake of the rapid geopolitical retreat of the 1990s was nigh $17 billion worth of debt that sub-Saharan nations owed to post-Soviet Russian federation.⁴

This disappointment gradually faded away over time and at present, ii decades on, Russian ruling elites once again view the African continent as a geopolitical and business opportunity.⁵ For example, oil behemothic Rosneft'due south search for business deals in Angola and Mozambique, countries in which its influential CEO Igor Sechin served as a military translator in 1980s, heralds Russia'south shift towards a more extractive arroyo.^half-dozen Thus, if earlier engagements led to an overall economical loss, Moscow now aspires to 'go along investments low but returns loftier'.^vii

If earlier engagements led to an overall economic loss, Moscow now aspires to 'go on investments depression but returns high'.

Economically, it aims to gain access to natural resource (oil, gas, diamonds etc.) while boosting exports of agro products (grain), fertilisers, arms and nuclear, digital and space technologies. Militarily, Russia frames itself as an anti-jihadist force striving to establish and deepen security ties with African armies and secure access to infrastructure to ensure the resupply and maintenance of its navy. Diplomatically, Russian federation seeks votes in back up of its positions at the United Nations (UN) or other political gestures that uphold Moscow's diplomatic posture internationally.^eight

The confidence that policies in sub-Saharan Africa can this time bring about quantifiable dividends are interlinked with Russia's great ability instincts and its preoccupation with securing the recognition of its global status. From the Russian point of view, sub-Saharan Africa is another battleground where established and rising powers disharmonism for resources, market shares and political influence.^ix Moreover, from 2010 onwards Russia has not derived its neat power condition exclusively from claims of pre-eminence in its immediate neighbourhood; its status is increasingly based on the power to conduct a global foreign policy. In this regard, ane Russian expert recently underscored that "Russian federation'due south policy in Africa shows that our geostrategic interests are wider than it is idea".¹⁰

This quest for condition recognition is re-enforced to some extent by the deterioration of relations betwixt Europe and Russia. As ties soured in the wake of the looting of Crimea and the sanctions-related costs of waging state of war in Donbas rose, Moscow doubled its efforts to heave the non-European aspects of its strange policy. Labelled equally a 'flanking strategy',¹¹ information technology seeks to demonstrate that Russia cannot exist isolated diplomatically and has viable economic alternatives.¹² To some degree, information technology serves to surprise and claiming Europe, gain new levers of influence and thus be able to up the ante beyond the European continent.

Last simply not least, a string of military, political or economic successes in the Middle Eastward and North Africa (MENA) have often paved the mode for Russian federation's forays into sub-Saharan politics. Kickoff, after boosting grain exports to Egypt since the mid-2000s, Moscow gained and expanded its share in Sudan's wheat market (from 5% to 55%) throughout the 2010s.¹³ Second, Russia capitalised on its intervention in Syrian arab republic to showcase and combat test its military equipment, acquiring new clients in sub-Saharan Africa every bit a upshot; its share in artillery exports to the region went upwardly from nineteen% to 28% between 2012 and 2018.¹⁴ Third, Moscow exploited the renewed Russia-Arab republic of egypt partnership to organise the first always Russia-Africa Summit in 2019, co-chaired past President Putin and President Sisi and held in Sochi.

There is a loftier caste of historical continuity hither: North Africa traditionally played an important office in Soviet strange policy¹⁵ and accomplishments there created the pre-conditions for appointment with southern Africa. The first conference of the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Arrangement (AAPSO) in Cairo in 1957, sponsored by the Kremlin, set the phase for the second i in Conakry in 1960 which facilitated Soviet outreach to African elites. The web of partnerships in Northward Africa served other purposes, too: for example, in 1967 Soviet planes piloted by Egyptians flew from Algeria to transport Soviet weapons to Nigeria.¹⁶ Therefore, more often than non, there was and still is a mental and textile link between Moscow's policy in the MENA and sub-Saharan Africa.

How: Russia's underdog strategy

Moscow is aware of its quasi-underdog status on the continent and at that place is a recognition that Russia lacks the resources of the Soviet Union.¹⁷ The Soviets could rely on client states to share the financial or military burden of its policies in Africa: between 1954 and 1968, 30% of the Soviet bloc'due south regional economic assistance to Africa came from Moscow'south Eastern European satellites.^xviii Similarly, Cuba, the USSR'southward Latin American ally, deployed troops to Africa, frequently in back up of the Soviet agenda.¹⁹ Today, Russia does not have such allies to rely on, something which (combined with its weak economical operation over the final decade) explains Moscow's attempts to win influence in sub-Saharan Africa on the inexpensive.

There is another recognised drawback. During the ii decades that Russia was largely absent-minded from sub-Saharan Africa, more than powerful external players filled the vacuum and Soviet-trained ruling elites gradually gave manner to a new wave of leaders.²⁰ Now, considering Russia came late to the competition for the future of Africa, information technology faces an uphill struggle to re-constitute a position even shut to what it held previously.

These limitations inform and shape Russia'due south electric current modus operandi. The Kremlin'due south rulebook in sub-Saharan Africa therefore prescribes a maximum utilize of existent advantages, a renewed outreach to African elites, the employ of sectoral niches in which Russian federation tin can be politically and economically competitive, the swift exploitation of new regional openings, and (where possible) cooperation with agreeing great powers already entrenched in the continent.

Information: Natural World, 2020; 88 unique public sources were consulted when preparing this visual.
Although these cannot be listed individually due to space limitations, the five nigh relied-upon sources were SIPRI, TASS, RIA, MID.ru, Proekt.media.

The Kremlin regards strategic communications (StratCom) equally an essential component to be fully exploited and create favourable weather condition for Russian federation's resurgence. For this reason, just as the Soviet news bureau TASS expanded its regional offices in the days of the Cold War, today Sputnik is in the early stages of multiplying its partnership agreements with local state media outlets so as to be able to directly provide what information technology refers to as 'untold stories'.²¹ While Russian StratCom denigrates sure competitors by constantly referring to the predatory behaviour of European imperial powers in the past,²² it boasts of the fact that it does not possess colonial baggage and presents itself²³ as a friend who shares African societies' traditional values, a partner for economic development and a bulwark against security threats.²⁴

There is, even so, another facet of Russia'due south StratCom, which comes in the form of a 'package of services for regime survival', catered to African leaders.²⁵ The early post-Soviet transition period gave rise to a cohort of 'political technologists' in Russia, who helped win elections with the use of balloter tricks ranging from simulated candidates, rigged opinion polls and kompromat (compromising and/or incriminating material) while still preserving the appearance of a legitimate political process.²⁶ In the 2000s, this political industry continued to flourish and with the Kremlin's patronage entered the cyber domain (bots, trolls, false web-pages etc.).²⁷ Recently, Moscow identified the usefulness of such 'ballot assistance' as a foreign policy tool and something which could provide a competitive border in weak states.

Over the last years, the list of sub-Saharan countries in which Russian spin doctors and/or tolls have operated has rapidly expanded. Although presented equally the initiative of individual enterprises, this 'electoral assistance' is usually deployed in parallel with cooperation in the security field, Russian federation'south diplomatic protection in international organisations and/or in some cases, loans. In plough, this helps create entry points and gain the trust of local ruling elites during times when they feel most vulnerable (elections, mass protests). States providing help to ward off or inhibit democratic changes and ensuring disciplinarian leaders' survival accept been labelled 'Black Knights'.²⁸ Russia has long supported such actors in the post-Soviet region, simply it has now expanded this model to sub-Saharan Africa.

Russia's 'Black Knight' posture sits well with its extractive approach every bit its protection does not come complimentary of charge. When shielding local rulers from domestic discontent and international pressure, the Russian government and its related companies often seek lucrative deals in return.²⁹ Protection is besides traded for various diplomatic gains: support in the United nations for Russia's position on Syria, an alignment with Moscow on restrictive cyber norms, or the withdrawal of the recognition of Kosovo, for example.

When information technology comes to Africa-related problems in the Un, Russian federation often finds itself on the aforementioned side of the fence as Prc. The calculation in Moscow is that the experience of mutually beneficial cooperation in Eurasia can be replicated in sub-Saharan Africa.^xxx Bilaterally, Russian and Chinese diplomats take pledged to coordinate their respective positions on Africa, while the 2 countries' navies have organised the beginning joint drills off the shores of South Africa.³¹ Only this is but half of the story.

Despite this credible alignment, Moscow too believes that the increased Chinese presence on the continent (and resultant unease generated among African elites) volition inadvertently bring virtually opportunities for other great powers. As sub-Saharan African states strive to diversify their international engagements to avoid overdependence on Prc, Russia, with its modest resources but valuable political and security services, might therefore gain traction and play a more than active role³² – as one keen observer put it: "there is People's republic of china hysteria in Africa, there is no Russia hysteria in Africa".³³ While Russian federation's underdog status can consequently assistance it to mount a deeper comeback in Africa, the success of this approach very much depends on how the sub-continent reacts to Russian federation'south overtures.

What practise Africans want from Russia?

Russia is only the latest global power to engage in the so-called 'new scramble for Africa'.³⁴ When Vladimir Putin convened representatives from all the 54 countries of Africa in Sochi in October 2019, he did a remarkable task of turning a sequencing of bilateral agreements with African governments into a highly symbolic celebration of Africa'southward commonage ambitions, potential and cocky-determination, while revamping one-time bonds and perceptions rooted in the Soviet, Cold-War era.

Russia highlights collaboration over aid, something which is tempting to African leaders who view the Due west's outreach as patronising.

According to figures cited past Putin, Russian merchandise with the African continent rose to $xx billion in 2018.³⁵ However, Due north Africa is responsible for the panthera leo's share of this sum, with Russian federation accounting for just effectually $4 billion of sub-Saharan African trade.³⁶ Nevertheless, full regional imports and exports with Russia grew by 43% between 2008 and 2018. This should be compared to trade dynamics with other major partners: imports from the US have stagnated, while exports brutal by most sixty% over the same period and overall trade with Mainland china and India grew by 85%, respectively. This means that Russian federation is among the fastest-growing merchandise partners for sub-Saharan Africa, yet its relative weight compared to the Eu (the largest trading partner, accounting for 25% of imports and 23% of exports) or China (around 12% of total imports and exports) is still negligible and it accounts for less than 1% of both Russian and sub-Saharan African global trade.³⁷

What, then, is prompting countries southward of the Sahara to consolidate and aggrandize partnerships with Russia? Four explanations tin be provided.

Strategic narratives

The first explanation has to practice with an alignment of strategic narratives in a changing world. Times have changed since the Soviet Marriage's efforts to counter 'Western imperialism' in Africa through Marxist credo: mod Russia's foreign policy has no such ideological ambitions, yet its narrative continues to stress opposition to Western interference in countries' domestic politics, be it through the promotion of democracy and man rights or military interventions, for instance.³⁸ Russia highlights collaboration over assist, something which is tempting to African leaders who view the West's outreach as patronising. African countries, in other words, tin can trust Russia as a strategic partner to counterbalance Western influence. The geopolitical potential of such an alignment is significant: for example, Russia has used its veto in the UN Security Council to protect African countries from human rights-related sanctions (Republic of zimbabwe in 2008), while in 2014, 24 African countries abstained from the Un General Assembly Resolution condemning Russia'southward annexation of Crimea (and 2 opposed it).³⁹

Political tips and tricks

Russia is anything but an donating role player when it helps partners. Indeed, given that influence and disinformation operations are core tenets of Russian federation's foreign policy around the world, why are the Kremlin'due south troll armies and political strategists not considered a threat in sub-Saharan Africa? The answer lies in the recent turn down of military coups as a way to reach regime change. While some observers saw the switch to a greater reliance on the processes of electoral republic^twoscore as a step towards a fourth wave of democratisation, the balloter climate in sub-Saharan Africa instead became toxic. Incumbents oft resort to a multifariousness of means and subterfuges to rig the results of elections in their favour: taking control of the state apparatus, amending the constitution, changing electoral laws, dominating the media, making arbitrary arrests and detaining opponents, as well every bit engaging in electoral fraud and repression. Russia'south disinformation toolbox and political engineering instruments are afterwards regarded as assets which can be used to influence the polls, while limiting accountability and minimising the risks of authoritarian leaders' directly responsibility in manipulating elections. Republic of madagascar was amongst the first (and volition not be the last) operations in this regard.⁴¹

As for sub-Saharan civil society groups, they tend not to perceive Russia as a bigger threat than other powers that again explicitly projected their influence and interests to the detriment of African ones (former colonial powers, the US). Close links between Russia and many African media outlets also oft protect Moscow from negative exposure.⁴² Finally, Soviet soft power continues to play a function in shaping perceptions, as USSR-era educational and diplomatic ties created useful networks which still endure in Africa today. It is these networks that Russia is reviving and supporting to help sustain its current strategy.

Rational selection: low-costs, high-gains

Tertiary, countries in sub-Saharan Africa are rational agents that decide which actions are worth pursuing, and which are not, based on a cost-benefits analysis.⁴³ In a context of growing multipolar competition and an increased global supply of deals and investment offers, African countries are in the enviable position of being able to pick and choose their economic partners. This benefits both their commonage agency (for case, in the pursuit of specific agendas in multilateral negotiations, such as the EU-African Matrimony (AU) partnership or the Doha Development Calendar) and private interests. From this point of view, Russia represents an opportunity to diversify their partnership and investor base, while decreasing dependency on large lenders such every bit China, and, consequently, minimising the risks of falling into a debt trap.⁴⁴ Furthermore, Russian investments embrace sectors that are at the top of many African governments strategic agendas, such as armaments and nuclear free energy, and in which Russia has a competitive reward vis-à-vis other global players. Russian federation'southward assistance, therefore, tends to come at relatively low costs and yield loftier gains by bypassing caveats or conditions that restrict the margin of manoeuvre of many Western partners.

Best seller?

Quaternary, the competition, or available alternatives, should be examined in order to understand Russia'southward attractiveness. Few other global actors currently offering a partnership that is as comprehensive equally Russian federation'south. Old colonial ties and conditionality hamper the appeal of the Eu and its member states, while the US under the Trump assistants has decreased both security and political engagement in Africa and accompanied what is left with a rhetoric of disdain and neglect. The Gulf states' and Turkey's influence is vulnerable to Red Sea rivalries and India mainly focuses on high-tech evolution. Finally, an over-reliance on China and the sustainability of Chinese infrastructure projects nether the Belt and Route Initiative (BRI) is becoming a source of business concern in many African capitals.

Seen through all these lenses, it is easy to sympathise why an expansion of trade volume betwixt Russia and Africa from $20 billion to $40 billion, as announced past President Putin in Sochi, is non only a matter of 'how much money', merely finds deeper roots in Africa's bureau in a multipolar world.

Is Russia in Africa the new normal?

Despite its attractiveness, projection of Russian power in Africa faces some limitations. First, Russia's share of influence in sub-Saharan Africa is still limited, and its approach has not been entirely successful. Despite the attention given to Russian private armed services contractors and artillery sales, and the high visibility of the Sochi Summit in the global media, Russia'south levels of bilateral merchandise, political influence and military presence remain comparatively low. Sometimes Russia is better at marketing its achievements than at really accomplishing things. Russian mercenaries are reportedly but nowadays in a few theatres, and non all of their engagements were successful.⁴⁵ Russia's 'great return' to sub-Saharan Africa is therefore more modest than the newspapers portray:⁴⁶ it is non part of a m, hegemonic strategy, but is instead opportunistic, driven by geo-political imperatives and seeks to develop selected clientelist relations with authoritarian leaders.⁴⁷ However, while lacking strategic appetite, this arroyo has withal provided Russia with an entry indicate.

Second, Russian noesis of socio-political realities in Africa is poorer than imagined. Electoral influence and disinformation operations, for instance, have so far been largely unsuccessful. In Madagascar, the Russian operation did not result in President Rajaonarimampianina's re-ballot, and Russian agents fabricated a belatedly switch to campaign for his rival Rajoelina after realising that the incumbent'due south chances of winning were negligible. Russia also lacks the capacities and diplomatic infrastructure to engage with local communities and politico-ethnic groups across Africa, something which severely undermines the effectiveness of its agents. While Moscow has the appetite to become a major actor in ballot operations, and it offers its support to African leaders at a competitive price, it would still take several years and huge investments to develop the necessary network and know-how to accept significant impact. An of import variable in this regard is also the survival of those long-standing sub-Saharan African leaders which currently rely on Russian help, as they are increasingly beingness pushed out through democratic transitions.⁴⁸

Third, even if an upward trend for Russian military and political influence is causeless in the adjacent 5-10 years, the render on investment for Russian federation could exist exposed to geopolitical shocks, with the subsequent take a chance of undermining the state's global strategy. The master lesson from Soviet engagement in sub-Saharan Africa was that costs exceeded the benefits: a multipolar world requires Russia to be resourceful, and may eventually push the Kremlin to act and so as to avoid being trapped in whatever geopolitical quagmires which lie exterior the areas of its immediate strategic interest. Russian federation may therefore opt for a pragmatic foreign policy strategy, keeping costs low but maximising the economic opportunities every bit much as possible, all the while keeping media attention high and then equally to amplify its engagement.

Moscow lacks the capacities and diplomatic infrastructure to appoint with local communities and politico-ethnic groups across Africa.

Fifty-fifty with those limitations, in that location are important short- and long-term implications for the Eu. In the short term, Russian federation's operations and deals in sub-Saharan Africa volition not constitute a direct threat to Europe, merely may undermine EU interests, external action and normative ability in specific areas. For example, Russian artillery sales accept had an impact on the mandate and effectiveness of the European union Preparation Mission in Central African Republic (EUTM-RCA) in matters related to security sector reform (SSR) and the implementation of the integrated approach to support the transition process.⁴⁹ Elsewhere, in mail-Bashir Sudan, Russian support to the Transitional War machine Quango and efforts to delegitimise the Sudanese opposition^fifty are at odds with the EU's approach to support a peaceful transition, promote civilian rule and condemn whatsoever grade of violence and man rights abuses.⁵¹

In the long term, should Russia sustain and manage to scale up its influence, the implications for Europe could incrementally worsen, expanding from single countries to the continental level, specially if Russian soft power and disinformation campaigns assist fuel anti-Western sentiment or hamper democratisation and good governance across sub-Saharan Africa. While it is unlikely that Russia will develop a continental grand strategy, the presence of a wide Russian-supported disinformation network or a patchwork expansion of private military companies would clash with Eu objectives and values. Yet whatever the exact time to come scenario, information technology is clear that Russia is there to stay in sub-Saharan Africa, alongside other global powers.⁵²

When adjusting its strategy towards sub-Saharan Africa, it is vitally important for the Eu to advisedly assess its priorities and office in the new African rest of power. The bigger (and perhaps graver) risk for the EU, from a strategic point of view, would be to become the fire fighter in a region where other players, including Russia, actively contribute to acts of political arson. To avert that event, moving from being a donor to a fully-fledged geopolitical histrion is paramount; 1 which is able to human action using soft and, equally required, hard ability tools. The European union's strategic approach will in particular need to balance European interests with the most pressing issues for sub-Saharan African countries, from employment to vehement extremism. In this process, the quality of the relationship (and of European union concrete engagements) matters more than the sheer quantity of Official Development Assistance (ODA) or Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flows – as the Russian underdog approach shows.

As multipolarism becomes the new normal in sub-Saharan Africa, Russia'south projection of influence is simply one element of a bigger systemic alter, simply a potentially bonny and dangerous 1 for Africans if information technology becomes uncontrolled or contributes to elite capture. Assuasive Russia to ready new trends and establish operating bases to delegitimise European values and perceptions on the African continent would be strategically imprudent. Current EU foreign policy instruments, from electoral support to crisis response and prevention, need the flexibility to operate in an environment where assistance should not only exist tailored to local needs, just be mindful of the growing impact of foreign influences. Beefing upwardly capacities for intelligence analysis, early warning and situational awareness, and reinforcing the political, press and data sections in EU Delegations could aid to counter or deter the propaganda and disinformation operations of foreign actors. At the pol-strategic level, re-assessing the relationship between the European union and sub-Saharan Africa in this new light should therefore be a priority every bit leaders from the ii continents appoint in the post-Cotonou negotiations and approach the 6th AU-EU Height.

References

* The authors would like to give thanks Karol Luczka and Carlo Palleschi for their inquiry aid in writing this Brief.
1) Milene Charles, The Soviet Union and Africa: the History of the Interest (United Press of America: Washington, 1980), p. 137.
two) Walter Walker, The Bear at the Dorsum Door (Foreign Affairs Publishing: Richmond, 1978), p. 9.
3) Kimberly Marten, "Into Africa: Prigozhin, Wagner, and the Russian Military", PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo, no. 561, January, 2019, http://www.ponarseurasia.org/sites/default/files/policy-memos-pdf/Pepm561_Marten_Jan2019_0.pdf.
iv) "UNCTAD Analyses the Debt of sub-Saharan African Countries to non-OECD Official Creditors", United Nations Briefing on Trade and Development, November 7, 1996, https://unctad.org/en/pages/PressReleaseArchive.aspx?ReferenceDocId=3737.
5) Vladimir Putin interview on Russian federation-Africa Summit in Sochi, Kremlin.ru, October 21, 2019, http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/61858.
6) "Rosneft Optics Africa, Sometime Soviet Posting of CEO", Reuters, April 23, 2014, https://www.reuters.com/article/rosneft-oil-co-angola-oil/update-1-rosneft-eyes-africa-former-soviet-posting-of-ceo-idUSL6N0NF33U20140423.
seven) Russian expert's remarks, closed-door issue, Moscow, 2019.
eight) Olga Kulkova, "Povorot Rossii one thousand Afrike: Kakovy Perspektivy? [Russia's plough to Africa: what perspectives?], Valdai Discussion Club, March v, 2018, http://ru.valdaiclub.com/events/posts/articles/lukomorya-bolshe-net/?sphrase_id=38196.
9) Vadim Balytnikov et al., "Vozrashenie Rossii v Afriku: Strategia i Perspektivy [Russian federation'south Return to Africa: Strategy and Perspectives]", Valdai Word Lodge, October, 2019, http://ru.valdaiclub.com/files/30230/.
10) Russian expert'southward remarks during a closed-door give-and-take, 2019.
eleven) Discussion with a Russian expert, 2019.
12) "Nazad v SSSR: Chto Rossiya Delayet 5 Afrike" [Back to the USSR: what is Russia doing in Africa?], Gazeta.ru,  March 6, 2018, https://world wide web.gazeta.ru/politics/2018/03/05_a_11672185.shtml.
xiii) "Where Does Sudan Import Wheat From? (2010)", The Observatory of Economic Complexity, https://oec.world/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/import/sdn/show/1001/2010/; "Where does Sudan import wheat from? (2017)", Ibid., https://oec.world/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/import/sdn/testify/1001/2017/.
14) Aude Fleurant, Pieter D. Wezeman, Siemon T. Wezeman and Nan Tian, "Trends in International Arms Transfers 2016", SIPRI Fact Canvas, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Feb 2017, https://world wide web.sipri.org/sites/default/files/Trends-in-international-arms-transfers-2016.pdf.
15) Dan C. Heldman, The USSR and Africa: Foreign Policy under Khrushchev (Praeger Publishers: New York, 1981), p. 109
xvi) Milene Charles, op. cit., pp. 91, 123.
17) Olga Kulkova, op. cit.
18) Charles Milene, op. cit., pp. 105-106.
19) George W. Breslauer, Soviet Policy in Africa (University of California: Berkeley, 1992), pp. 166-195.
twenty) Olga Kulkova, op. cit.
21) Dan C. Heldman, op. cit., p.83, and "RDC: l'agence de presse Sputnik signe un accordance de partenariat avec le radiodiffuseur national congolais", Agence Ecofin, May 24, 2019, https://www.agenceecofin.com/medias/2405-66458-rdc-l-agence-de-presse-sputnik-signe-un-accordance-de-partenariat-avec-le-radiodiffuseur-national-congolais; "Sputnik widens its reach in Africa", Broadcast Media Africa, May 24, 2019, https://broadcastingandmedia.com/news/1951.
22) "Europe Sucked Wealth from Africa, in Debt to Continent", RT, May 26, 2013, https://www.youtube.com/watch?five=WITpoxF-BKg.
23) Olga Kulkova, op. cit.
24) Vladimit Putin interview, op.cit.
25) Vladimir Frolov, "Glovokruzhenie ot Uspehov. I vo Vneshenei Politike Putin Pogruzilsea v Proshloe" [Lightheaded from Success. Putin's Strange Policy Inspires from Past], Republic, Dec 23, 2019, http://commonwealth.ru/posts/95500?.
26) Andrew Wilson, Virtual Politics: Faking Democracy in the Post-Soviet World (Yale University Press: New Haven, 2005).
27) Daniil Turovskii, Vtorzhenie. Kratkaia Istoria Russkih Hakerov" [Invasion. A brusk History of Russian Hackers] (Individuum: Moscow, 2019), pp. 236-245.
28) Steven Levitsky, Lucan A. Manner, Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes afterwards the Cold War (Cambridge Academy Printing: New York, 2010).
29) Theo Neethling, "How Russia is growing its strategic influence in Africa", The Conversation, February half dozen, 2019, http://theconversation.com/how-russia-is-growing-its-strategic-influence-in-africa-110930.
xxx) Olga Kulkova, op. cit.
31) Press Release on Deputy Minister Mikhail Bogdanov's meeting with Chinese Ambassador to Russian federation Zhang Hanhui, MID.ru, October 28, 2019, http://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/3868709.
32) Olga Kulkova, op. cit.
33) Expert'due south remarks during a closed-door discussion, 2020.
34) Judd Devermont, "The Fine art of Summitry", CSIS Brief, Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 30, 2019, https://www.csis.org/assay/art-summitry.
35) "Remarks by President Vladimir Putin at the Russian federation-Africa Summit, Sochi, October 24, 2019, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/61893.
36) There is a discrepancy between Russia trade with sub-Saharan Africa ($4.nine billion) and sub-Saharan Africa trade with Russia ($iii.8 billion), based on Earth Depository financial institution data.
37) Imf, Management of Trade statistics, 2017. See also: Dhruv Gandhi, "Africa's new trading partners", Brookings Institution, March 7, 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2018/03/07/figure-of-the-week-africas-new-trading-partners/.
38) Paul Stronski, "Late to the Political party: Russian federation'southward Return to Africa", Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 2019, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/WP_Paul_Stronski_-_Russia-Africa-v31.pdf.
39) Martin Russell and Eric Pichon, "Russia in Africa: A new arena for geopolitical competition", Briefing, European Parliamentary Research Service, November 2019, p. eight, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2019/642283/EPRS_BRI(2019)642283_EN.pdf.
forty) Jakkie Cilliers, "The hereafter of democracy in Africa", African Futures Paper, no. 19, Institute for Security Studies, October 2016, https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/af19.pdf.
41) "Madagascar: les mystères de 50'influence russe sur la présidentielle,"Jeune Afrique, November 14, 2019, https://www.jeuneafrique.com/856822/politique/madagascar-les-mysteres-de-linfluence-russe-sur-la-presidentielle/.
42) Anton Troianovski, "'A New Message': Russia Trains Its Propaganda Machine on Africa", The New York Times, October 29, 2019, https://world wide web.nytimes.com/2019/ten/29/globe/europe/africa-russia-sochi.html.
43) See, for example: Maddalena Procopio, "Why Russia is not like China in Africa", Commentary, Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazioinale, November 15, 2019, https://www.ispionline.it/en/pubblicazione/why-russia-not-china-africa-24409.
44) Courtney Goldsmith, "Is a new debt crisis mounting in Africa?", World Finance, August five, 2019, https://www.worldfinance.com/special-reports/is-a-new-debt-crisis-mounting-in-africa.
45) Martin Russell and Eric Pichon, op. cit., p. 4.
46) Camillo Casola, Maddalena Procopio, Eleonora Tafuro Ambrosetti, "Russia in Africa: What'south New?", Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, Nov 15, 2019, https://www.ispionline.information technology/it/pubblicazione/russia-africa-whats-new-24400; and Véronique Dussaussois, "La portée limitée du réinvestissement russe en Afrique subsaharienne", Les Carnets du CAPS – Middle d'analyse de prévision et de stratégie, Ministère de l'Europe et des Affaires Etrangères, no. 27, Eté-Automne 2019, p. 71-82.
47) Peter Fabricius, "From Russia with love – or perhaps non?", ISS Today, Establish for Security Studies, October 4, 2019, https://issafrica.org/iss-today/from-russia-with-love-or-perhaps-not.
48) Alex Vines, "Africa's Long-standing Leaders Are Disappearing", Chatham House, January iii, 2020, https://www.chathamhouse.org/good/comment/africa-due south-long-continuing-leaders-are-disappearing.
49) On EUTM-RCA, see: https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/20190919_mission_factsheet_eutm_rca.pdf.
50) Samuel Ramani, "Moscow's Paw in Sudan'southward Future", Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, July 11, 2019, https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/79488.
51) Council of the EU, "Sudan: Foreign Affairs Council statement", Brussels, June 17, 2019: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/printing/press-releases/2019/06/17/sudan-foreign-affairs-quango-statement/.
52) Alex Vines, "Global Date With Africa Connected to Surge in 2018", Chatham House, January eight, 2019, https://www.chathamhouse.org/good/comment/global-appointment-africa-connected-surge-2018.

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Source: https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/russias-forays-sub-saharan-africa

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